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ABSTRACT: In the context of resistances to the historical 'blows' to 'human self-love' 
enumerated by Sigmund Freud (Copernicus decentering the Earth; Darwin removing the 
barrier between humans and animals; his own efforts in showing how the unconscious subverts 
the supposed mastery of the conscious ego), Jacques Lacan's early formulations and probings 
on the topic of subjectivity in his second seminar include, in a not uncharacteristic, but yet 
somewhat bizarre, digression, an envisionment of 'science fiction' involving the extinction of the 
entire human population and a recording device which continues to operate following the 
event. Specifically, Lacan questions what consequences this has for our understandings of 
consciousness (including subsequent philosophical objections); what status the recording 
instrument would possess; and what a repopulating society would make of the recorded 
materials once they had learnt to access and interpret them. 
In exploring this scenario, along with what Lacan describes as his 'materialist definition of the 
phenomenon of consciousness', we will begin to appreciate how the notion of the human 
becomes a psychical assemblage pieced together to experience a fragile unity. Relatedly, the 
human species will historically be seen to have carried with it, and continually reinforced, 
certain fundamental prejudices: cosmological, biological and psychological. What the 'limit' 
example of extinction will make clear is the extent to which the material world affects the 
human 'prerogatives' of self-preservation and self-interest.  
What is called for is the overcoming of historical preconceptions along with the forms of 
domination they are invariably coupled with. Recent discussions of extraterrestrial colonization 
will be seen then to be mere compensatory narratives which ultimately obfuscate the very real – 
and urgent – need to rethink our misguided sense of 'control'. Does the ultimately destructive 
(and in some respects irreversible) course engaged in vis-à-vis Earth's natural environment – 
due to this form of universalized narcissism – necessarily need to be countered with the 
prospect of humankind's own obliteration in order for change to occur? 
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HUMANITY'S THREE BLOWS 
Freud often liked to reminisce on the times in human history when established 
norms were shattered by scientific developments and wholesale changes in the 
ways in which people think about themselves and the world. And, of course, 
there was always an element of self-promotion involved in this: he rated his 
own 'discovery' of unconscious processes among these epoch-shifting 
illuminations.   
His principal references, returned to across his work, are Copernicus and 
Darwin. In 'A Difficulty in the Path of Psycho-Analysis', an article from 1917,1 
for example, he diagnoses the human being as suffering from a general, 
universalized form of narcissism, namely 'self-love', which has come into 
conflict with particularly paradigm-altering scientific innovations in the course 
of its short history: the three blows as he calls them. 
Firstly, a blow against the geocentric view that Earth is the centre of the 
universe and that humans themselves are "in the centre of a circle that enclosed 
the external world".2 This he relates, importantly, to feelings of domination. 
Ultimately, it was through the findings of Copernicus in the sixteenth century, 
but also, much earlier, the casting of doubt on the Earth's position in the 
universe by Aristarchus and the Pythagoreans before the Common Era, that 
delivered mankind's self-love its first, cosmological, blow. 3 
The second blow or form of domination that was shifted concerned the 
relation of humankind to the animal world. Namely, following the sacralization 
and worship of animals, i.e. early belief systems, the clear demarcation made 
between Animalia and humanity, to the advantage, of course, of the latter. 
Darwin, who clearly resituated this perspective, delivered the second, this time 
biological, blow.4 
 
1 Sigmund Freud, 'A Difficulty in the Path of Psycho-Analysis', in J. Strachey (ed.), The Standard Edition of 
the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud: Vol. XVII, trans. J. Strachey, London, Hogarth, 1955, pp. 
139–141. 
2 Ibid., p. 140. 
3 He notes both "Aristarchus of Samos" (ibid.) and "Alexandrian science" generally (Freud, 'Introductory 
Lectures on Psycho-Analysis (Part III)', in J. Strachey (ed.), The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological 
Works of Sigmund Freud: Vol. XVI, trans. J. Strachey, London, Hogarth, 1963, p. 285). 
4 Even though Linnaeus eventually classified Homo sapiens under Animalia (Kingdom), Mammalia (Class), 
Primates (Order) in the Systema Naturae, with different specifications from the first edition in 1735 to the 
tenth in 1758, a number of important differentiations were added (e.g. having a soul or mind or being a 
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The third blow concerns domination of the mind, according to Freud. 
Introducing the idea that things could be going on which were not conscious to 
us provided the psychological blow, which he says is "perhaps the most 
wounding".5 From the universe, to its world and other creatures, to its very self, 
humanity has had to gradually accept that it is neither master "in its own 
house" nor at home as such.6 
The issue, for Freud, is that as the sense of self gradually evolved along with 
the advanced functions of human cognition, it unfortunately brought with it a 
sense of mastery and a related feeling of being in control. Therefore, in the 
commonplace assumption, consciousness, he states, offers the raw material; the 
human ego organizes it; the will carries out what it has to; and all is good: 
Friede, Freude, Eierkuchen (or peace, joy, pancakes, as the German saying goes). 
Crucially, however, the development of the study of mental illnesses from 
the late nineteenth century onward granted insights which challenged these 
supposed ideas of unity and mastery. Since the discovery and explication of 
unconscious processes, we have been able to comprehend that the mind is 
much more convoluted and home also to "alien guests" which "seem to be 
 
'wise man'). The similarities between humans and animals had however been noted in earlier classifications 
from antiquity onward: the Great Chain of Being and 'missing link' (later corrected as 'last common 
ancestor') viewpoints fed into these separations. 
5 Freud, 'A Difficulty', p. 141. 
6 Ibid., p. 141, p. 143; Freud, 'Introductory Lectures', p. 285. Lutheran theologian Oswald Bayer contrasts 
Freud's view with that of Kant who, in his Die Metaphysik der Sitten, writes:  
"Zur inneren Freiheit aber werden zwei Stücke erfordert: seiner selbst in einem gegebenen Fall 
Meister (animus sui compos) und über sich selbst Herr zu sein (imperium in semetipsum), d.i. 
seine Affekten zu zähmen und seine Leidenschaften zu beherrschen. – Die Gemütsart (indoles) in 
diesen beiden Zuständen ist edel (erecta), im entgegengesetzten Fall aber unedel (indoles abiecta, 
serva)."  
Immanuel Kant, Werke in zwölf Bänden: Band 8 (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1977), pp. 538–539. 
Quoted in Martin Luthers Theologie: eine Vergegenwärtigung (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2007), p. 167. In A. 
Wood's translation: 
But two things are required for inner freedom: being one's own master in a given case (animus sui 
compos), and ruling oneself (imperium in semetipsum), that is, subduing one's affects and governing 
one's passions. – In these two states one's character (indoles) is noble (erecta); in the opposite case it 
is mean (indoles abiecta, serva).  
In M. Gregor (ed.) Practical Philosophy (The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant), Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 535. Bayer draws attention to the role of one's 'hidden faults' in the 
Psalms which Luther acknowledged cannot all be enumerated; hence Freud was not the first to contest 
the type of view put forward by Kant, he argues.  
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more powerful than those which are at the ego's command".7 For example, our 
unwanted thoughts, desires, actions… 
In his Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis from the same period, he 
notes that the myriad resistances encountered to the ideas promulgated by 
psychoanalysis are symptomatic of adherence to those previous established 
values and views of the mind which privilege the unity of the human being and 
its supposedly advanced position in the order of things.8 Again, he brings in the 
colossal historical blows: 
In the course of centuries the naïve self-love of men has had to submit to two 
major blows at the hands of science. The first was when they learnt that our earth 
was not the centre of the universe but only a tiny fragment of a cosmic system of 
scarcely imaginable vastness. This is associated in our minds with the name of 
Copernicus, though something similar had already been asserted by Alexandrian 
science. The second blow fell when biological research destroyed man's 
supposedly privileged place in creation and proved his descent from the animal 
kingdom and his ineradicable animal nature. This revaluation has been 
accomplished in our own days by Darwin, Wallace and their predecessors, 
though not without the most violent contemporary opposition. But human 
megalomania will have suffered its third and most wounding blow from the 
psychological research of the present time which seeks to prove to the ego that it 
is not even master in its own house, but must content itself with scanty 
information of what is going on unconsciously in its mind.9 
While the first of the blows described by Freud is (hopefully) incontestable 
by now, the second and third still encounter resistances to the present day. In 
relation to the second, biological, blow, for instance, in addition to religious or 
moral accounts still favouring the elevation of mankind, most current human 
societies attempt to maintain a fairly divisive strategy of separation toward the 
animal kingdom, with, perhaps, notable exceptions: namely the endangered or 
 
7 Freud, 'A Difficulty', p. 141. 
8 Freud, 'Introductory Lectures', p. 284: In "emphasizing the unconscious in mental life", he states, "we 
have conjured up the most evil spirits of criticism against psycho-analysis". Yet he urges one to not be 
surprised at this and attribute it to the difficulty of the concepts or "the relative inaccessibility of the 
experiences which provide evidence of it". 
9 Ibid., pp. 284–285. He would revisit these comments in 'The Resistances to Psycho-Analysis' (in J. 
Strachey (ed.), The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud: Vol. XIX, trans. J. 
Strachey, London, Hogarth, 1961, p. 221), in 1925, where he uses the term human self-love ("menschlichen 
Eigenliebe"). 
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domesticated. 
This is in fact related to mankind's continuing obsessions with being the 
dominant/dominating species which in turn has had broader environmental 
consequences. Indeed we can associate each of the forms of blow – 
cosmological, biological, psychological – with concomitant forms of domination 
– that of the planet, that of animals and – due to the false security of the 
mastery of the self – that of other people. 
Moreover, psychologically, while mainstream scientists are increasingly 
finding neurological evidence of unconscious processes, as well as their 
influence and importance,10 there is indeed still widespread resistance to 
accounts of the human subject where the individual self, whether posed in 
terms of consciousness or otherwise, is not the "organising centre" of the 
human being. 11 
Due to a combination of these factors, one particularly salient scenario, 
which we are looking at today, is that of continuing species and indeed (the 
prospect of) human extinction. The major recognised human influence 
contributing to varieties of extinction, as well as making the very planet 
uninhabitable, is our detrimental environmental impact. One environmental 
group, the Voluntary Human Extinction Movement, even argues that the most 
environmentally conscious and ethical step that we could take would be to 
cease reproduction and thus remove our species from the planet entirely.  
A HISTORY OF VIOLENCE 
Yet despite the popular focus, in the past decade especially,12 on pushing 
nature too far and having irreversible negative effects on the planet, our 
environmental footprint and the emerging threats therefrom are far from being 
 
10 Nonetheless, "it is elementary to note that a large number of psychical effects that are legitimately 
designated as unconscious, in the sense of excluding the characteristic of consciousness, nevertheless bear 
no relation whatsoever, by their nature, to the unconscious in the Freudian sense". See Jacques Lacan, 
'The Instance of the Letter in the Unconscious, or Reason Since Freud', in Écrits, trans. B. Fink, New 
York, Norton, 2006, p. 428. 
11 Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book II. The Ego in Freud's Theory and in the Technique of Psychoanalysis, 
trans. S. Tomaselli, New York, Norton, 1988, p. 48. 
12 In academia, politics and popular discourse from Gore to climate change or from An Inconvenient Truth to 
An Inconvenient Sequel. 
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recent discoveries or obsessions. Richard Grove, who established 
environmental history as an area of inquiry in the modern university, writing in 
Nature in 1990,13 argued that "the history of anxiety over the environment"14 
may be characteristic of modern Western societies but it is for that matter 
nothing new. 
By the mid-seventeenth century, he notes, there had come to exist an 
"awareness of the ecological price of capitalism" (defined, in his account, in 
largely colonialist terms) which had "started to grow into a fully fledged theory 
about the limits of the natural resources of the Earth and the need for 
conservation".15 As early as 1858, Grove found, the threat of human extinction 
was too raised, tied directly to "'The General and Gradual Desiccation of the 
Earth and Atmosphere'", as the title of a paper by J. Spotswood Wilson, 
presented to the British Association for the Advancement of Science, described 
it.16 Grove interestingly adds that:  
The raising, as early as 1858, of the spectre of human extinction as a consequence 
of climatic change, was clearly a shocking psychological development. But it was 
consistent with fears that had been growing among the scientific community. 
Awareness of species rarity and the possibility of extinction had existed since the 
mid-seventeenth century as Western biological knowledge started to embrace the 
whole tropical world. The extinction of the auroch in 1627 in Poland and the 
dodo by 1670 in Mauritius had attracted considerable attention. Again, the 
mechanisms of extinctions, and the contribution of man to the process, first 
began to be clearly grasped on the tropical island colonies.17 
 
13 Richard Grove, 'The Origins of Environmentalism', Nature, vol. 345 (3 May 1990), pp. 11–14. See also his 
Green Imperialism: Colonial Expansion, Tropical Island Edens and the Origins of Environmentalism, 1600–1860, New 
York, Cambridge University Press, 1995. 
14 Grove, 'The Origins of Environmentalism', p. 11. His conclusion, from an analysis of the early history of 
devastation, following, for instance, the activities of the East India Company and felling of much of the 
natural vegetation on Mauritius, that "states can be persuaded to act to prevent environmental 
degradation only when their economic interests are shown to be directly threatened" (ibid., p. 12) is, 
unfortunately, as pertinent today. 
15 Ibid., p. 12. Hence he argues that: 
Time and again from the mid-eighteenth century onwards, scientists discovered that the threat 
of artificially induced climatic change, with all it implied, was one of the few really effective 
instruments that could be employed in persuading governments of the seriousness of 
environmental change. 
16 Ibid., p. 14. 
17 Ibid. 
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It was in fact in Tasmania, Grove notes, that the first Western legislation on 
the protection of birds was introduced in 1860, which stemmed from these 
concerns; Britain only followed suit six years later.18 Tellingly, Grove concludes 
that at the time "Western-style economic development, spread initially through 
colonial expansion, was increasingly seen by more perceptive scientists as 
threatening the survival" of mankind.19 
Philosophically, it was in the same era that Friedrich Nietzsche recognized 
mankind's "will to self-depreciation" which had been "unstoppably on the 
increase" since Copernicus' time: "Gone, alas, is his faith in his dignity, 
uniqueness, irreplaceableness in the rank-ordering of beings" he argued in On 
the Genealogy of  Morality, published in 1887.20 Following mankind's cosmological 
dethronement, the human species has been on a "downward path", Nietzsche 
finds, and "seems to be rolling faster and faster away from the centre".21 And 
this view he had indeed contextualized, years earlier, in terms of the 
insignificance of humanity in its broader natural environment: in On Truth and 
Lying in an Extra-Moral Sense from 1873, he writes: "how pitiful, how shadowy 
and fleeting, how purposeless and arbitrary the human intellect appears within 
nature. There were eternities when it did not exist; and someday when it no 
longer is there, not much will have changed".22 
In the present day, as a team from the University of California and the 
Human Evolution Research Center argue, we are widely regarded as being in 
the sixth phase of mass extinction in the history of the planet, known as the 
 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morality, trans. C. Diethe, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 2006, p. 115. The present author would like to thank one of the anonymous reviewers of this article 
for suggesting the inclusion of Nietzsche's views on mankind's ultimate inconsequentiality and the 
devaluation of its consciousness. Nietzsche is indeed even critical of the natural scientific view of the 
subject, following Darwin, as "eternal": "Involuntarily, all natural science assumes the unity of the subject, 
its eternity and immutability". See '27[37]' in Posthumous Fragments available at 
http://www.nietzschesource.org/#eKGWB/NF-1873,27[37]. 
21 Nietzsche, On the Genealogy, op. cit. 
22 In Friedrich Nietzsche on Rhetoric and Language, ed. and trans. S. L. Gilman, C. Blair and D. J. Parent, New 
York, Oxford, 1989, p. 246. One indeed sees how Nietzsche foreshadows Freud and Lacan in his re-
evaluation of human faculties and capacities: "The arrogance associated with knowledge and sensation 
lays a blinding fog over man's eyes and senses and deceives him about the value of existence by instilling 
in him a most flattering estimation of this faculty of knowledge." Ibid. 
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Holocene or Anthropocene extinction. Mass extinctions are defined as "times 
when the Earth loses more than three-quarters of its species in a geologically 
short interval, as has happened only five times in the past 540 million years or 
so".23 Moreover, in total, "Of the four billion species estimated to have evolved 
on the Earth over the last 3.5 billion years, some 99% are gone".24 This sixth 
phase, as is increasingly being established, is being caused by humans "through 
co-opting resources, fragmenting habitats, introducing non-native species, 
spreading pathogens, killing species directly, and changing global climate". 25 
The prospect of human extinction, while measured on scales between 
hundreds and thousands of years, to hundreds of thousands of years, it must be 
added, and by some relegated to the fact of the Sun at some stage burning out, 
is nevertheless still an anxiety surrounding environmental discourse. The most 
notable recent context is perhaps that of the colonization of other planets.26 
The following summary by the physicist Mark Buchanan neatly ties up 
contemporary anxieties and the increasingly – for some at least – less fantastical 
notion of leaving Earth behind (as opposed, perhaps, to addressing the more 
serious and immediate concern of our own impact): 
Catastrophic events on Earth have previously wiped out many long-lived species, 
and there's a small but non-zero chance that Earth could, in any given year, get 
obliterated — by an undetected asteroid or comet, or a nearby supernovae. Or 
human life might get erased from the planet by our inaction in the face of the 
pressures we're putting on the biosphere, or by overaction in the form of an out-
of-control engineered biological organism. Given enough time, human extinction 
might be a more or less certain prospect — unless we spread from the planet.27 
THE PRIMACY OF THE HUMAN 
Why is it then that we react to environmental devastation, scarcity of 
resources and habitability of the planet only when our own, human, survival is 
threatened? We will now turn to a scenario of human extinction developed by 
 
23 Barnosky et al., 'Has the Earth's Sixth Mass Extinction Already Arrived?', Nature, vol. 471 (3 March 
2011), p. 51. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid. 
26 I.e. debates surrounding Musk and Mars. 
27 Mark Buchanan, 'Colonizing Mars', Nature Physics, vol. 13 (November 2017), p. 1035. 
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Lacan in his second seminar and see how it ties in to Freud's notion of the 
'blows' outlined above.28 It concerns the psychoanalytic conception of 
consciousness as well as its consequences for the predominating human views of 
the world described. 
Lacan's famous theory of the mirror stage, where the infant between 6 and 
18 months first learns to recognise its reflection, involves some of the first steps 
in the human attainment of a sense of unity which forms the basis of the 
supposed mastery of the ego or individual discussed above. This is, according to 
Lacan 
based on the relation between, on the one hand, a certain level of tendencies 
which are experienced – let us say, for the moment, at a certain point in life – as 
disconnected, discordant, in pieces – and there's always something of that that 
remains – and on the other hand, a unity with which it is merged and paired. It is 
in this unity that the subject for the first time knows himself as a unity, but as an 
alienated, virtual unity.29 
Lacan picks up on issues surrounding the blows enumerated by Freud in his 
second seminar, held from 1954 to 1955, which is focused on the role of the ego 
in psychoanalytic theory, and adds insights from his developing theories on the 
subject and the mirror relation. He speaks of the resistances to, and within, 
analysis broadly and notes the ways in which Freud 'decentred' the human 
being. Freud, he says 
discovered in man the substance and the axis of a subjectivity surpassing the 
individual organisation considered as the sum of individual experiences, and even 
considered as the line of individual development. I am giving you a possible 
definition of subjectivity, by formulating it as an organised system of symbols, 
aiming to cover the whole of an experience, to animate it, to give it its meaning. 
And what are we trying to realise here, if not a subjectivity?30 
 
28 The account is cursory and speculative but nonetheless insightful. Indeed, Lacan notes in The Seminar of 
Jacques Lacan, Book VII. The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, trans. D. Porter, New York, Norton, 1997, p. 39, that 
there exists "no plausible reason why reality should be heard and should end up prevailing. Experience 
proves it to be overbundant for the human species, which for the time being is not in danger of extinction. 
The prospect is exactly the opposite." Nevertheless, possibilities such as nuclear holocaust, then a present 
danger, led him to elaborate on the significance of threats to human existence in the same seminar (p. 
105). 
29 Lacan, Seminar II, p. 50. 
30 Ibid., pp. 40–41. 
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The unconscious, following this account, "is the unknown subject of the 
ego" which "is misrecognised [méconnu] by the ego".31 But the unconscious is 
also, for himself and Freud, "der Kern unseres Wesens", i.e. the core of our being or 
existence, our essence.32 This core, however, "does not coincide with the ego" 
nor with what we refer to as 'I', as the ego is only a "particular object within the 
experience of the subject"33 inside what he terms the imaginary function.34 
"Everything Freud wrote", he goes on to argue, "aimed at reestablishing the 
exact perspective of the excentricity of the subject in relation to the ego".35  
In line with the psychological forms of domination based on established 
norms discussed earlier, Lacan hence defines that which "corresponds to the 
ego" as 
what I sometimes call the sum of the prejudices which any knowledge comprises 
and which each of us has as individual baggage. It is something which includes 
what we know or think we know – for knowing is always in some way believing 
one knows.36 
Thus, when "shown a new perspective, in a manner which is decentred in 
relation to your experience, there's always a shift, whereby you try to recover 
your balance, the habitual centre of your point of view", he explains.37 And yet, 
"what the analytic experience highlights," Lacan notes, "and what Freud 
doesn't know what to do with, like a fish with a fig, are the illusions of 
consciousness".38 Here he attempts to undermine the idea of "the transparency 
of consciousness to itself" and create a 'symbolic', unconsciously 
 
31 Ibid, p. 43. Or as Evans puts it: "the subject is not simply equivalent to a conscious sense of agency, 
which is a mere illusion produced by the ego, but to the unconscious". Dylan Evans, An Introductory 
Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis, London, Routledge, 2006, p. 198. 
32 Lacan, Seminar II, p. 43. 
33 Ibid., p. 44. 
34 Later it will further involve the ego's identifications and counterparts. As Alan Sheridan notes 
('Translator's Note', in The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XI. The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, 
trans. A. Sheridan, New York, Norton, 1998, p. 279) the imaginary is:  
the world, the register, the dimension of images, conscious or unconscious, perceived or imagined. In this 
respect, 'imaginary' is not simply the opposite of 'real': the image certainly belongs to reality and Lacan 
sought in animal ethology facts that brought out formative effects comparable to that described in 'the 
mirror stage'. 
35 Lacan, Seminar II, p. 43. 
36 Ibid., p. 41. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid., p. 45. 
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overdetermined, pre-'individual' notion of subjectivity.39 
In the class of this seminar on 'A materialist definition of the phenomenon 
of consciousness' he asks the audience to consider the visual aspects of 
consciousness in terms of mirror images. He then makes the digression of 
asking what the status of consciousness would be in the absence of humans if a 
device were to record their complete demise. 
The following is quoted from his class: in it he clearly separates the notion 
of human consciousness and that of the ego or individual self;40 establishes the 
continual existence of a material reality not reliant on human perception or 
even humanity; and notes how a camera or recording device can take on an 'I' 
function which however is not to be confused with the controlling ego… 
What is the image in the mirror? The rays which return on to the mirror make us 
locate in an imaginary space the object which moreover is somewhere in reality. 
The real object isn't the object that you see in the mirror. So here there's a 
phenomenon of consciousness as such. That at any rate is what I would like you 
to accept, so that I can tell you a little apologue to aid your reflection. 
Suppose all men to have disappeared from the world. I say men on account of the 
high value which you attribute to consciousness. That is already enough to raise 
the question – What is left in the mirror? But let us take it to the point of supposing 
that all living beings have disappeared. There are only waterfalls and springs left 
– lightning and thunder too. The image in the mirror, the image in the lake – do 
they still exist? 
It is quite obvious that they still exist. For one very simple reason – at the high 
point of civilization we have attained, which far surpasses our illusions about 
consciousness, we have manufactured instruments which, without in any way 
being audacious, we can imagine to be sufficiently complicated to develop films 
themselves, put them away into little boxes, and store them in the fridge. Despite 
all living beings having disappeared, the camera can nonetheless record the 
image of the mountain in the lake, or that of the Café de Flore crumbling away 
in total solitude. 
Doubtless philosophers will have all kinds of cunning objections to make to me. 
But nevertheless I ask you to continue to listen to my apologue. At this point the 
men return. It is an arbitrary act of Malebranche's God – since it is he who 
 
39 Ibid., p. 45. Individual but not individuated? See his notion of the unary trait, particularly in the tenth 
seminar. 
40 Which is part of an ongoing dialogue with Descartes that spreads from the 1930s to the late 1970s. 
 KIRK TURNER 361 
sustains us in every moment of our existence, there is no reason why he couldn't 
have obliterated us and a few centuries later put us back into circulation. 
Perhaps men would have to learn everything anew, and especially how to read 
an image. It doesn't matter. What is certain is that – as soon as they saw on the 
film the image of the mountain, they would also see its reflection in the lake. 
They would also see the movements which took place on the mountain, and 
those of the image. We can take things further. If the machine were more 
complicated, a photo-electric cell focused on the image in the lake could cause an 
explosion – it is always necessary, for something to seem efficacious, for an 
explosion to take place somewhere – and another machine could record the echo 
or collect the energy of this explosion. 
So then! this is what I want you to consider as being essentially a phenomenon of 
consciousness, which won't have been perceived by any ego, which won't have 
been reflected upon in any ego-like experience – any kind of ego and of 
consciousness of ego being absent at the time. 
You'll tell me – Just a minute though! The ego is somewhere, it's in the camera. No, there's 
not a shadow of ego in the camera. But, on the other hand, I am quite happy to 
admit that there is an I in it – not in the camera – up to something in it. 
I am explaining to you that it is in as much as he is committed to a play of 
symbols, to a symbolic world, that man is a decentred subject. Well, it is with this 
same play, this same world, that the machine is built. The most complicated 
machines are made only with words. 41 
Consciousness, then, merely involves "a surface such that it can produce an 
image" which is its 'materialist' definition.42 An image he defines as "the effects of 
energy starting from a given point of the real".43 Like the reflections of light 
which bounce off of a surface and land on a "corresponding point in space", it 
is the "fibrillary layers" of the "area striata of the occipital lobe", now recognized 
as a section of the brain's visual cortex, which "behaves like a mirror"44: 
All that's needed is that the conditions be such that to one point of a reality there 
should correspond an effect at another point, that a bi-univocal correspondence 
occurs between two points in real space.45 
 
41 Ibid., pp. 46–47. 
42 Ibid., p. 49. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid. 
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Here he contrasts real space with imaginary space (for instance, the object 
in the mirror and its material counterpart). However, imaginary, he cautions, 
by no means is directly equated with the subjective, as there "are illusions that 
are perfectly objective, objectifiable".46 Hence he argues that the ego, which is a 
"structuring image"47, itself too "really is an object": 
The ego, which you allegedly perceive within the field of clear consciousness as 
being the unity of the latter, is precisely what the immediacy of sensation is in 
tension with. This unity isn't at all homogenous with what happens at the surface 
of the field, which is neutral. Consciousness as a physical phenomenon is 
precisely what engenders this tension.48 
In his account, "the tension between the subject – which cannot desire 
without being fundamentally separated from the object – and the ego, where the 
gaze towards the object starts, is the starting point for the dialectic of 
consciousness".49 He will add that "the reflection of the mountain in a lake" is 
"the myth of a consciousness without ego", noting that consciousness "is by 
essence a polar tension between an ego alienated from the subject and a 
perception which fundamentally escapes it".50 In the development of the idea of 
the contemporary human, nonetheless, consciousness has come to take on an 
almost mystical privilege linked to notions of development, species 
accomplishment and intelligent life: 
Implicitly, modern man thinks that everything which has happened in the 
universe since its origin came about so as to converge on this thing which thinks, 
creation of life, unique, precious being, pinnacle of creation, which is himself, 
with this privileged vantage-point called consciousness.51 
What the running recording device hence makes clear – existing as the 
symbolic structure "detached from the activity of the subject"52 – is that there 
are aspects of consciousness without a 'self'. In addition, the recorded image 
 
46 Ibid. The image in the lake or a mirage, for instance. 
47 Ibid., p. 257. 
48 Ibid., pp. 49–50.  
49 Ibid., p. 177. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid., p. 48. Further, "consciousness is linked to something entirely contingent, just as contingent as the 
surface of a lake in an uninhabited world – the existence of our eyes or of our ears". Ibid., p. 47. 
52 Ibid., p. 47. 
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involves imaginary space much like our consciousness – a form of reflection of 
real objects – which is furthermore in a constant relation with the symbolic 
overdeterminations of language and our interpretations. In this and later 
seminars Lacan goes to great lengths to redefine consciousness and the 
unconscious, broadening their definitions and linking each with (and 
demarcating them from) perception. Our experience of consciousness is 
continuously imbricated with unconscious material beyond our control, he will 
argue, the physical nature of both the process and material reality itself, as well 
as the direction and limits of language. 
What the example of the world without mankind shows is that there is no 
special status granted to an oversimplified notion of human consciousness as 
the apotheosis of species evolution, revealed in Lacan's, Freud's and indeed 
Nietzsche's work. Instead, it is the mastery of the human ego, which many 
conflate unreflectively with consciousness, which has created this 
conclusion/confusion. And as we saw earlier, this is merely one way in which 
mankind seeks to justify its stance as dominator. 
Hence the 'limit' example of extinction, although the 'return of mankind' 
Lacan describes may too, like extra-terrestrial colonization, be a compensatory 
comfort in this narrative, marks the point at which world and the non-
'individual' within the human organism meet, the material aspect of mankind 
independent of the experiencing, reflecting, mastering ego. The contemporary 
cognizing person, a psychical assemblage pieced together to experience a 
fragile unity, needs to feel a sense of control of the self, nonetheless, as well as of 
nature and of the cosmos, which it does not in fact possess. As such, accounts 
which highlight the degree to which each human being is subjected to the 
(symbolic and other) structures in which it is embedded, as well as the 
unconscious processes which undercut its alleged sovereignty, can help 
undermine this grip. 
Overcoming the human cosmological, biological and psychological 
prejudices, and their corresponding forms of domination, is a necessary step, 
then, in the drastic bid to alter our role in environmental and species-level 
devastation in lieu of further displacement measures such as future 
colonizations. If it takes the possibility of the demise of mankind to confront our 
universalized narcissism then this should be done head on without recourse to 
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fantasies of escape. The energy and imagination, not to mention billions of 
dollars, invested in the latter at this stage in human history need to be 
redirected toward a sustainable and affirming – for all forms of life – path of 
stabilization.  
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